Jakarta, JARING.id Jambi Governor Zumi Zola was caught up in a bribery and corruption case after three of his men were arrested in the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK OTT) Hand-Catch Operation in November 2017. He allegedly received money from the contractor and gave it as “knock money” to members of the Jambi DPRD when the 2018 Jambi Provincial Budget Draft (RAPBD) was ratified.
Zumi is one of only two regional heads arrested for corruption and bribery of DPRD members. The same case happened to the former Bekasi mayor Mochtar Mohamad in 2011.
Two weeks after the announcement of Zumi as a suspect by the anti-rasuah agency, it was the turn for Central Lampung Regent Mustafa to follow in his footsteps. Mustafa has officially been detained by the KPK since February 16, 2018. The pattern is almost the same, starting with the arrest of subordinates and DPRD members who accept bribes, then following the regional head.
This incident made the list of regional heads and legislative members arrested by the KPK even longer. From KPK data collected by JARING in the 2011-2018 range, 8 regional heads have been arrested for giving bribes in the APBD discussion to 58 regional legislative members. The discussion of the APBD is the case with the most number of suspects, reaching 66 people, dominated by members of the DPRD.
Meanwhile, regional heads dominate corruption cases such as receiving gifts or promises from the licensing process, promotions, procurement of goods and services, project mark-ups and misuse of APBD. There were 34 regional heads arrested in this case, while 2 members of the DPRD. The total number of suspects in this corruption case is 36 people, dominated by regional heads.
Apart from that, 12 regional heads were arrested for other cases such as the bribery of prosecutors or judges in criminal cases and regional head election disputes. So that from all cases, a total of 57 regional heads and 60 legislative members were arrested by the KPK. This means that 117 regional political actors have become corruption suspects in the span of 8 years.
Majority Support Anomaly
Executive Director of Saiful Mujani Research & Consulting (SMRC), Djayadi Hanan, said that if you look at the institutional pattern of corruption, regional heads tend to act as bribes and DPRD members as recipients. One reason for this is that the method for producing regional regulations (perda) related to APBD or non-APBD is prioritized by consensus, not voting.
The consensus method encourages regional heads to seek as much support as possible from factions in the DPRD. Efforts to gain support are often the reason regional heads bribe factions by relying on "illegal" sources of funds such as corruption in licensing, job auctions, procurement of goods and services, projects, mark-ups, and misuse of the APBD.
"For licensing and all kinds, that is the executive area. In the DPRD, the institutional source for obtaining illegal or illegal income is from the APBD approval. So it is natural that many DPRD members who are corrupt are related to the approval of the APBD, ”said Djayadi when contacted Tuesday, February 27 2018.
If the issue of support becomes the reason for compelling regional heads to bribe DPRD members, the regional heads who are carried by the party with the majority seats in the council should not be dragged into bribes.
For example, the Regent of Musi Banyuasin Pahri Azhari, the 5 parties that brought him forward in the 2011 Pilkada won 28 out of 45 seats in the 2014 legislative election. LPJ 2014 and approval of the 2015 APBD.
Even though the number of seats in the council seemed to be on his side, Pahri still had difficulty making decisions and had to rely on "facilitation" payments. The Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem) once conducted an analysis of the difficulty level of decision making using the effective number party in parliement (ENPP) index. The smaller the ENPP index (<3), the easier it is to make decisions because there are no more than three dominant parties. On the other hand, the larger the ENPP index (> 5), the more difficult it is to make decisions because there are many dominant parties in the DPRD. By using the mathematical formula proposed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), the Musi Banyuasin ENPP Index reaches 8.
Theoretically, the high ENPP index results in two things, firstly a prolonged conflict between the executive-legislature which leads to a deadlock. Second, the occurrence of political corruption involving the executive and legislature in the form of a cartelised party system. In the Indonesian context, deadlocks in the formulation of public policies between regional heads and DPRD are almost rare.
"In other words, policy bribery is made to facilitate discussion of public policies in the midst of disagreement with the DPRD. This bribe can be used as a basic instrument for elected regional heads to smooth out local regulations or APBDs proposed by the regional government and require DPRD approval, "said Perludem's release entitled Prospects for Government in the 2015 Regional Election Results on February 29, 2016.
However, a new problem arose again when members of the legislature from 5 parties supporting Pahri also took bribes. Pahri should not have needed to bribe the party that supported it, it was enough to bribe the opposition party in conditions of high party fragmentation in the DPRD. Regional heads who paid bribes to their coalition in the approval of the APBD also occurred in Mojokerto Regency, Central Lampung Regency, Riau Province, Jambi Province and North Sumatra Province.
The Executive Director of the Election and Democracy Syndication, August Melasz, argues that one of the causes of the high level of corruption in the regions is the impact of the expensive electoral system. The electoral system currently being developed emphasizes the personalization of actors, so that regional head candidates or legislative candidates must bear the cost of imaging in order to be popular and elected.
In addition, Indonesia does not have a clear political party funding scheme. During elections, campaign costs are borne by candidates. The party's role is only as a vehicle.
"In the end, people are forced to look for any source of funding, whether they come from concessions and cukong-cukong in the regions or those who already have positions, they must negotiate with parties who are involved in the formal process of policy making," he said when contacted Tuesday, February 27 2018.
If the data on the 34 regional heads with corruption are described in more detail, 13 of them are still related to the election. Some have just been elected, have re-nominated or one of their family members has nominated themselves. However, for the most part, 21 regional heads are not in the election year.
August added that the political needs of politicians are not limited to elections only. But caring for constituents as a necessity for political interaction requires a financing component. Until now it has never been known how this need was financed. Party funding, election contestation and interaction with constituents are still considered the responsibility of candidates.
The party also did not develop a public involvement scheme in funding. Agreeing with that, Djayadi assessed that the party membership system had not developed so that the community did not want to contribute to the party. Moreover, if it is drawn to economic problems, the economic conditions of most people are still problematic.
"It's different if we go to America. In America, if there is a candidate for regional head or legislative candidate who is good, then he will talk to the public and the public will busy funding. This is the reverse, "he said.
Although the political party's financial assistance has increased to one thousand rupiah per vote, this assistance only covers 10 percent of the party's operational needs. The rest, so far, the public can only guess and tend to be prejudiced against the source of party finance, apart from deposits made by regional heads and legislators.
State Party Funding
August thinks there should be a gradual increase in aid to parties from the state. Assistance does not have to be in the form of funding, but can be other components that are equivalent in value to party needs.
Among the many components of party funding, it must be prioritized which one should be funded first. For example, the initial stage, the government provides professional education. The next stage, the government can intervene in funding party deliberations in the regions.
Political parties must also change their strategy for public seats and political office. If all this time it has been borne by the candidates, the portion must be reduced and the party takes over. Regarding the high cost of the current electoral system, the alternative is to change the system or the cost of the system to be minimized.
"Our electoral system is expensive and this is a burden on the personal. That's why to pay for all of these, if there is no standard and open scheme, we will never know. This kind of situation will continue to emerge and believe me the list in the KPK will continue to pile up, "he explained.
Arie Sujito, a sociologist at Gadjah Mada University and IRE Senior Researcher, said that in reality the local election system had a direct impact on high political costs. Candidates and political parties must be encouraged to do low political costs and a system that encourages parties to be accountable to their cadres who are involved in corruption.
So that more and more local governments are not caught in corruption, prevention efforts that involve a system are needed and not only focused on prosecution. Action alone will never reduce the perpetrators of corruption.
The trend of arrests of regional officials by the KPK from 2011-2018 in general has increased significantly. In the range of 2013-2014, the graph experienced a decline, but again rose from 2015-2017. Even as of early February 2018, there have been 10 cases of arrests. [Deborah Blandina Sinambela]